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Abstract
This paper provides a simple theory to study how the allocation of
public funds between primary and higher education aects human cap-
ital accumulation. The allocation is endogenously determined through
majority voting. Public funding for higher education is not supported
when a majority is poor. In some cases, higher education starts to be
realized as a majority of individuals accumulate enough human capital
through primary education. Although the emergence of higher educa-
tion can accelerate aggregate human capital accumulation, it widens
income inequality because the very poor are excluded from higher ed-
ucation and the declined budget share for primary education decreases
its quality.
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1 Introduction
Human capital accumulation can be an engine of economic growth, and the
government has signicant roles in providing formal education. In many ex-
isting studies, human capital is produced in a single education sector, where
an amount of government expenditure is a direct input. In reality, however,
an education system is divided into multiple stages, such as primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary education, and the government supports each of them.
Primary and secondary (K-12) education has a particularly big dierence
from tertiary education in the sense that it is mandatory but serves everyone
for free although college education is optional and requires private spending.
It is relatively recently, however, that a number of studies have begun to
analyze how the allocation of government expenditures for dierent educa-
tion sectors aects economic growth and income distribution (Restuccia and
Urrutia, 2004; Su, 2004; Blankenau, 2005; Blankenau et al., 2007; Arcalean
and Schiopu, 2010). In particular, with heterogeneity in income or innate
ability, a policy that changes budget allocations across dierent education
sectors may increase the welfare of some individuals at the expense of others
as shown by Su (2004) and Blankenau et al. (2007), which provides fertile
ground for politico-economic analysis. For example, enhancing college edu-
cation may most benet the rich but may not benet the poor who cannot
aord to attend there or those whose private return from college is low due
to their low innate ability.
This paper proposes an overlapping generations model in which the allo-
cation of a given level of public education expenditures for multiple education
sectors is determined via majority voting and analyzes its eects on human
capital accumulation. Individuals live for two periods, childhood and adult-
hood, and they have children when they are adult. Individuals in adulthood
make all the economic and political decisions but they care about human
capital of their children. The government operates two education sectors,
which we call primary and higher education sectors. Primary education is
compulsory but serves all childhood individuals free of charge. On the other
hand, higher education is optional and requires private expenditures. In each
education, private return on education depends on resource allocations from
the government and parental human capital. Parents with low human capital
are unable to or unwilling to have their children receive higher education be-
cause its private return is low or they are too poor to cover its private costs.
Parents whose human capital is above some threshold are willing and able
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to have their children obtain higher education. We show that the individual
with median human capital is the decisive voter although preferences for the
allocation policy are not necessarily single-peaked.
Our model generates various dynamics of human capital accumulation
and steady state income inequalities. As long as human capital of the median
voter is below some threshold, all the resources are provided for primary edu-
cation. In some cases, the median voter accumulates sucient human capital
through primary education and a positive share of government expenditure
is allocated to higher education. Although the emergence of higher educa-
tion can facilitate aggregate human capital accumulation, it widens steady
state income inequality because the very poor are excluded from higher ed-
ucation and declined share for primary education diminishes its quality. In
other cases, public support for higher education is never realized if the initial
human capital level of the median voter is low.
The relationship between the political economy of education policies and
economic growth has been studied at least since Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992) and Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993). A more recent example includes
Galor et al. (2009), who examine an incentive of agents who are better
endowed with production factors to prevent the implementation of public
education. They argue that landowners wish to block policy changes that
promote human capital formation and unequal distribution of landownership
has an adverse eect on growth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a model,
and Section 3 analyzes individuals' decisions of investment in higher educa-
tion. Section 4 studies how the share of government budget for primary and
higher education is determined under majority voting. Section 5 examines
interactions between the education policy and human capital accumulation.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We study an overlapping generations model. Each generation consists of a
unit mass of individuals who live for two periods, childhood and adulthood.
Every individual, who belongs to a lineage indexed by i, has one child in
the second period. The only source of heterogeneity across individuals is the
human capital of their parents. Individual i born in period t derives utility
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from consumption in her adulthood and human capital of her child:
U(cit+1; hit+1) = cit+1 + hit+1; (1)
where cit+1 is the consumption in her adulthood and hit+1 is the human
capital of her child.
In the childhood, individuals make no decisions but receive compulsory
primary education supplied by the government. After the completion of the
primary education, their parents may decide to have them receive further
education, or higher education, which is also supplied by the government.
Higher education requires a private cost, whose size is xed and normalized
to one. Parents cannot borrow against future human capital of their children
and therefore must self-nance the cost. In the adulthood, individuals make
all the economic and political decisions. They supply their human capital
to a rm that transforms one unit of human capital to one unit of a nal
good. The nal good market is perfectly competitive and therefore the wage
per unit of human capital is one. Individuals also vote for an allocation of
government expenditures on primary and higher education, which determines
the quality of each education. After that, they decide, as parents, whether
they have their children receive higher education and then consume all the
remaining wealth.
If individual i born in period t + 1 receives only primary education, she
accumulates human capital according to
hit+1 = B
P

GPt+1
ht

hit;  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1); (2)
where hit+1 is the human capital output, B
P is the productivity parameter
of primary education, GPt+1 is the government expenditure on primary educa-
tion, hit is her parental human capital, and ht is the average (and aggregate)
human capital of the parental generation. The term GPt+1=ht should be inter-
preted as the number of teachers hired at primary schools. Since the wage
per unit of human capital paid by the nal good sector is one, the government
must compensate the same wage rate to hire an old individual as a teacher.
The cost of hiring teachers are thus ht and G
P
t+1=ht represents the number of
teachers.
If individual i receives higher education, she accumulates human capital
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according to
hit+1 = B
P

GPt+1
ht

hit +B
A

GAt+1
ht

hit; (3)
where GAt+1 is the government expenditure on higher education and B
A is its
productivity parameter. The term GAt+1=ht represents the number of teachers
employed at higher education institutions. We assume that
BA  BP : (A.1)
Income is taxed at the rate of  2 (0; 1), and the tax revenue is ht. The
government allocates the revenue to primary and higher education, which
leads to
GPt+1 = xt+1ht; (4)
GAt+1 = (1  xt+1)ht; (5)
where xt+1 2 [0; 1] is the share of government expenditure on primary educa-
tion. In period t+ 1, individuals born in period t vote for the value of xt+1,
which aects the human capital of their children. Substituting out GPt+1 and
GAt+1 from (2) and (3) gives the human capital level of individual i born in
period t+ 1:
hit+1 = B
Pxt+1
hit (6)
if she receives only primary education, and
hit+1 = B
Pxt+1
hit +B
A(1  xt+1)hit (7)
if she receives higher education.
3 Investment in Education
Given the share of government expenditure on primary and higher education,
each individual decides whether she invests in higher education for her child.
When individual i with hit has her child obtain higher education, (1) and (7)
give her utility, V E(xt+1; hit), as
V E(xt+1; hit) = [(1  )hit   1] + [BPxt+1 +BA(1  xt+1)]hit: (8)
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The rst term is the consumption in her adulthood and the second term is
human capital of her child. When individual i decides not to have her child
receive higher education, (1) and (6) give
V N(xt+1; hit) = (1  )hit +BPxt+1hit; (9)
where V N(xt+1; hit) is her utility.
Individual i with hit is able to invest in higher education for her child if
(1  )hit  1, which is equivalent to
hit  1
1   
H: (10)
Individual i is willing to have her child receive higher education if and only
if V E(xt+1; hit)  V N(xt+1; hit). Simple calculations show
hit 

1
BA(1  xt+1)
 1

 H(xt+1): (11)
H 0(x) > 0 since smaller share of government expenditure on higher education
lowers its productivity, which makes more individuals unwilling to invest in
education for their children. H(x) satises
H(0) =

1
BA
 1

and lim
x!1
H(x) =1: (12)
We assume that
H > H(0); (A.2)
which means that higher education is not aordable for some individuals. In
the following analysis, it is useful to dene x(hit) by
H [x(hit)] = hit , x(hit) = 1  1


1
BAhit
 1

: (13)
Figure 1 sketches H(x) as well as H.
Let us consider decisions of parents born in period t and their resulting
utility under given xt+1. If 0  hit < H, individual i is unable or unwilling
to have her child receive education and her utility is therefore V N(xt+1; hit).
If hit  H, then there are two cases that must be considered; (i) 0  xt+1 
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0 xt+1
hit
1
H(xt+1)
H
x(hit)
Figure 1: Feature of H(x)
x(hit) and (ii) x(hit) < xt+1  1. In the case where 0  xt+1  x(hit),
individual i is willing and able to have her child get higher education, and
her utility is V E(xt+1; hit). On the other hand, if x(hit) < xt+1  1, she is
able but unwilling to have her child receive education because small share
on higher education, 1   x, makes its productivity low. Her utility is hence
V N(xt+1; hit).
4 Political Equilibrium
Based on the analysis so far, this section identies the most preferred share for
each individual and characterizes political equilibrium. First of all, higher
education is not aordable for any xt+1 2 [0; 1] if 0  hit < H. Since
V N(xt+1; hit) is increasing in xt+1, an individual with hit 2 [0; H) prefers
xt+1 = 1. In order to identify the most preferred share of an individual with
hit  H, let us dene x by
x = arg max
xt+1
V E(xt+1; hit): (14)
By the rst order condition,
x =
(BP=BA)
1
1 
1 + (BP=BA)
1
1 
2 (0; 1): (15)
The remaining task in order to nd out the most preferred share is to
compare V E(x; hit) with V N(1; hit). Although individuals prefer xt+1 = x
under the presumption that they invest in higher education for their children,
the individuals may prefer to set xt+1 = 1 and to choose not to invest in
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0 xt+1
Vit
1x(hit) x

V N
V E
Figure 2: Welfare of individuals with hit 2 [ H;H(x))
higher education. If x > x(hit), or equivalently hit < H(x), then individual
i with hit is unwilling to have her child receive higher education. Hence, she
obviously prefers xt+1 = 1 to xt+1 = x
. Figure 2 draws the welfare of such
individuals as a function of xt+1. If x
  x(hit), or hit  H(x), then an
individual with hit is willing to have her child obtain higher education at
xt+1 = x
. However, V N(1; hit) may exceed V E(x; hit). Simple calculations
show that V E(x; hit)  V N(1; hit) is equivalent to
BA(1  x)  BP 1  (x)	 hit  1: (16)
Since we assume BA  BP , the inequality can be rewritten as
hit 

1
fBA(1  x)  BP [1  (x)]g 
 1

 ~H > H(x): (17)
Figure 3 (a) and (b) depict the welfare of an individual with hit < ~H and
hit  ~H, respectively. The following lemma summarizes the obtained results.
Lemma 1 Individual i with hit prefers xt+1 = x
 if hit  ~H, while prefers
xt+1 = 1 if hit < ~H.
It is easy to show that the individual with median income is the decisive
voter although V (xt+1; hit)  max

V N(xt+1; hit); V
E(xt+1; hit)
	
is not neces-
sarily single peaked. This result immediately follows from lemma 1. Let hmt
denote the human capital of the individual with median income. If hmt < ~H,
then she prefers xt+1 = 1 the most. Since individuals whose human capital is
less than ~H, who comprises of 50 percent of the total population, also prefer
xt+1 = 1 the most, it is chosen in majority voting. Similarly, if hmt  ~H,
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0 xt+1
Vit
xx(hit) 1
V N
V E
(a)
0 xt+1
Vit
x x(hit)
V N
V E
(b)
1
Figure 3: Welfare of individuals with hit  H(x)
then the median voter prefers xt+1 = x
. Since individuals whose human
capital is greater than ~H, who consist of 50 percent of the total population,
also prefer xt+1 = x
, it is chosen in majority voting.
Proposition 1 Under majority voting, xt+1 = 1 if hmt < ~H, and xt+1 = x

if hmt  ~H.
5 Dynamic Analysis
This section analyzes equilibrium dynamics. It should be remembered that
the realization of higher education only relies on whether or not hmt exceeds
~H. Let h1, h

2, and h

3 denote
F P (h1; 1) = h

1 , h1 = (BP )
1
1  ; (18)
F P (h2; x
) = h2 , h2 =

BP (x)
 1
1  ; (19)
FA(h3; x
) = h3 , h3 =

BP (x) +BA(1  x) 11  ; (20)
respectively. There are three cases that need to be considered; (i) ~H  h1,
(ii) h1 < ~H  h3, and (iii) h3 < ~H.
First, let us consider the case where ~H < h1. Figure 4 (a) sketches
the dynamics of hmt. If hm0 < ~H, higher education is not realized at the
rst place and all individuals consequently accumulate their human capital
according to F P (hit; 1). However, human capital of lineage m eventually
exceeds ~H at some time period, say t^, following which higher education
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is always realized and hmt converges to h

3. Human capital dynamics of
individuals in the other lineages can also be easily observed. As shown in
Figure 4 (b), individuals in lineage i with hit^  H(x) always have their
children receive higher education since period t^, and human capital in such
lineages converges to h3.
For an individual in lineage i such that hit^ < H(x
), there are two possi-
bilities. If h2  H(x) as in Figure 4 (c), then human capital in the lineage
converges to h3 although individuals in the lineage obtain only primary ed-
ucation for some periods after period t^. In this case, human capital in any
lineage converges to h3 and there is hence no steady state income inequality.
If h2 < H(x
), human capital in the lineage converges to h2 because it evolves
according to F P (hit; x
) at period t^ and the subsequent periods. This dy-
namics is shown in Figure 4 (d). As contrasted with the case of h2  H(x),
there is considerable income inequality in the long-run. In the steady state,
some individuals obtain both primary and higher education while the others
obtain only primary education, and moreover, the quality of primary educa-
tion is diminished since a positive share of the government budget is used to
nance higher education. This creates high income inequality. Notice that if
hm0  ~H, then t^ = 0 and the above analysis remains intact.
Second, we need to discuss the case where h1 < ~H  h3. In this case,
the realization of higher education is dependent on the value of hm0. Figure
5 (a) depicts the dynamics of hmt. If hm0 < ~H, hmt converges to h

1 <
~H.
Higher education is hence never realized, and human capital of all lineages
converges to h1. There is no income inequality in the long-run. If hm0  ~H,
on the other hand, higher education is realized at the beginning, and hmt
converges to h3. Dynamic analysis on the other lineages is essentially the
same as that in the case where ~H  h1 and hm0  ~H (t^ = 0). For lineage i
such that hi0  H(x), all individuals obtain higher education all the time
and hit converges to h3. For lineage i such that hi0  H(x), the dynamic
behavior of hit depends on the value of h

2 and H(x
). If h2  H(x), hit
follows the path illustrated in Figure 4 (c). Every individual in the economy
obtain h3 in the steady state and there is income inequality in the long-run.
If h2 < H(x
), all individuals in a lineage with hi0 < H(x) receive only
primary education and hit converges to h

2 as shown in Figure 4 (d). This
generates substantial long-run income inequality.
Finally, in the case where h3 < ~H, higher education is not realized in
the long-run. If hm0  ~H, then higher education obtains majority support
in the beginning, but hmt eventually falls below ~H, following which higher
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hmt
hmt+1 45
h3h

1
FA(hmt; x
)
F P (hmt; 1)
hmt^
(a)
H(x) h1 h

3
0
45
hit
hit+1
~Hhit^
FA(hit; x
)
F P (hit; 1)
(b)
0 hit^H(x
)h2 h

1 h

3
hit
hit+1 45
FA(hit; x
)
F P (hit; 1)
F P (hit; x
)
(c)
hit^ h

2H(x
) h1
F P (hit; 1)
F P (hit; x
)
45
0 hit
hit+1
(d)
Figure 4: Dynamics of hmt and hit in the case of ~H  h1
education is not realized as illustrated in Figure 5 (b). The level of human
capital in any lineage consequently converges to h1 and there exists no income
inequality in the long-run.
6 Conclusion
The government plays an important role of funding both primary and higher
education. This paper provides a theoretical examination on how the alloca-
tion of public expenditures across the each education inuences the dynamics
of human capital accumulation if the allocation is determined through ma-
jority voting. Primary education is compulsory while higher education is
optional and requires private expenditures. When a majority of individuals
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0 ~Hh

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
3
hmt
hmt+1
FA(hmt; x
)
F P (hmt; 1)
(a)
0 h1 h

3 ~H
45hmt+1
hmt
FA(hmt; x
)
F P (hmt; 1)
(b)
Figure 5: Dynamics of hmt in the case of h

1 <
~H  h3 and h3 < ~H
have not accumulated enough human capital, public funding for higher ed-
ucation is not realized. In some cases, however, the individuals accumulate
human capital suciently, and higher education begins to obtain majority
support. This enables a majority of individuals to accelerate their human
capital accumulation although it decreases the budget share for primary ed-
ucation and declines its quality. As an economy grows, income inequality
can expand between individuals who obtain higher education and those who
do not.
We have assumed that individuals must cover private costs to obtain
higher education supplied by the government. The logic of our model would
be applied to other public policies by considering a situation in which access
to publicly provided services requires private spending. For example, the
government may consider two policies: (i) public support to enhance pro-
ductivity in high-tech industries that employ skilled workers, and (ii) lump-
sum transfer of a tax revenue to all individuals. Rich individuals who can
cover education costs to be a skilled worker would prefer public support for
high-tech industries while poor individuals would prefer lump-sum transfer.
The implication of such a situation for economic growth would be a topic of
future research.
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